Pilot's chilling final words before largest loss of life on British airliner

The notorious airport disaster that still holds the record as the worst crash in British aviation history claimed the lives of 146 people in 1980.

In the 1970s and 1980s, British airline Dan-Air rose to prominence as the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. At 9.20am on April 25, 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 left Manchester Airport bound for . The flight was primarily filled with British holidaymakers seeking to swap the UK for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands.

Tenerife North, previously known as Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the two international on the island. It's situated at a height of 2,000 ft, making it a particularly challenging airport for pilots to navigate. The conditions are often cloudy, sometimes resulting in poor visibility due to sea winds.

Three experienced pilots were on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. Additionally, there were five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants to 146.

For three hours, everything seemed fine until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds typically blew from the Atlantic to the west, but on this fateful day, they were coming from the opposite direction, necessitating the use of Runway 12 instead, reports

Air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34, found himself unable to authorise the standard descent procedure due to another aircraft also heading for Runway 12, bringing the two planes perilously close to a mid-air collision. With no radar available at the airfield, Camin had to manage traffic movements procedurally, directing each aircraft to follow a predetermined route in turn.

At approximately 1.18pm, Camin realised he needed to place the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead landed safely on Runway 12. However, there was a snag - there was no established holding pattern for that runway, forcing Camin to think on his feet. His plan was for Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and stay in this loop until the other flight was clear.

In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin instructed, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Upon receiving the message, the captain responded with a simple "Roger", neglecting to repeat Camin's instructions. Had Captain Whelan done so, the impending disaster could have been averted.

When Camin instructed the crew to "turn to the left," he meant to say "turns to the left," indicating the direction they should take around the holding pattern. However, without the plural verb, the transmission sounded like an instruction to simply "turn to the left." Camin, who had also cleared the flight to ascend to 5,000 feet, had made a small but crucial mistake.

Captain Whelan, confused by the unexpected order to enter a holding pattern not marked on his charts, made a single left turn to a heading of 150 degrees, believing he was following the controller's instructions. The aircraft was now flying over a mountainous area with a minimum safe altitude of 14,500 feet.

Just over a minute before the crash, one of the pilots expressed concern, saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" and adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." The cockpit voice recording revealed growing unease among the crew, but no one questioned the controller's instructions.

Camin, mistakenly believing the plane was over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, allowed the aircraft to descend another 1,000 feet, completely unaware that it was actually flying over the mountains. In the cockpit, Captain Whelan voiced his doubts to his co-pilot. "I don't like that."

The co-pilot responded, "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" Just then, the automatic ground alarm sounded in the cockpit, warning them to "pull up, pull up!" In a frantic bid to evade the mountain, Captain Whelan abruptly switched from his left turn into a sharp right turn, believing he could bypass the terrain.

Co-pilot Firth, upon examining the chart, realised this was an incorrect course of action and proposed alternative suggestions to the captain. "Lets get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is recorded saying on the CVR, as Captain Whelan continued to veer the plane sharply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. Spanish investigators later concluded that this single manoeuvre eliminated any possibility of escape.

Flight Engineer Carey's warning of "Bank angle, bank angle!" can be heard before the CVR cuts out. Dan-Air flight 1008 crashed directly into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit.

The impact instantly destroyed most of the plane, scattering debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued for several hundred meters before it hit the ground, fell into a ravine, and broke apart.

Small fires broke out from the crushed wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport. Rescuers reached the site within hours, but it was immediately clear that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash.

A grim report revealed that not a single complete human body was found after the catastrophic crash, with many of the passengers' remains unidentifiable. While Spanish investigators acknowledged the air traffic controller's mistake, they piled the majority of blame on the Dan Air crew.

British experts countered, suggesting the controller should have earlier recognised the perilously close proximity of the aircrafts, thus using a standard holding pattern to avert the crew's confusion.

Moreover, UK investigators admitted that even though the Dan Air crew didn't question or seek clarity on the instructions, the controller shouldn't have proposed an experimental holding pattern. Their critique extended to his approval for flight 1008's descent to a mere 5,000 feet; official guidelines would have set a minimum safe altitude at 7,000 feet.

In the thick of fog and cloud, the captain, without visibility, executed a fateful right turn following a ground proximity alert-contrary to typical procedures demanding an upward maneuver-which led the plane directly into the mountain. Amidst all debate, what stands undisputed is the chilling butterfly effect initiated by the omission of a single letter-a miscommunication that sealed a tragic fate.

Simply put, had "turns" instead of "turn" been communicated, the dreadful accident might have been entirely avoided. The findings from the crash investigation led to a renewed emphasis on clear, standardised procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns.

The incident underscored the importance of clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - ensuring that pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions to avoid any misunderstandings.

Despite the tragedy, Dan Air managed to bounce back and continued its operations until 1992 when it was absorbed by British Airways. Even though it was the deadliest incident involving a British airliner, the memory of Dan Air Flight 1008 and the 146 lives lost that tragic day, is not as vividly remembered as it should be on its 45th anniversary.